Paul G. Halpern.
The Battle of the Otranto Straights: Controlling the Gateway to the
Adriatic in WWI. Indiana University Press, 2004.
By Aaron Plamondon
Department of History, University of Calgary |
 |
Although Professor Halpern admits that this story is one that is
rarely referred to as one of the great naval battles in history, he
humbly points out that it was, indeed, the largest encounter between
warships in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean during the First
World War. It was also one of the first encounters at sea where
aircraft played a definitive role at sea; air power was not decisive
as it later becomes in the Second World War, but it was, as Halpern
noted, “an indication of things to come.” The battle also
elucidates for students that Austria and Hungary were once united as
a great power and, despite being seemingly landlocked, not only did
they have access to the sea but also control of most of the eastern
shoreline of the Adriatic. Moreover, the traditional maritime
powers of Britain, France, and Italy had difficulty contending with
the Austro-Hungarian k.u.k. Kriegsmarine as it was difficult
for them to bring any power to bear within that area; they could not
enter the Adriatic for fear of mines and Austro-Hungarian
submarines. The Austro-Hungarians had a true battle fleet that
consisted not just of smaller ships and subs, but Dreadnoughts as
well. And even after Italy entered the war on the side of the
Entente, the Italian battle fleet was not in the Adriatic at all,
but was located at Taranto, in the arch of the Italian boot.
Halpern
goes into great detail of the events leading to the battle in the
Adriatic and those fascinated with naval and Great War history will
truly find it a compelling read. The book contains excellent sourcing,
as Halpern has cited extensive correspondence from participants of the
war, and used the War or National Archives in Italy, Austria, and London
to tell his story with finesse. Halpern points out, for example, the
curiosity of the Triple Alliance naval convention of 1913, where it was
decided that Italy and Austria-Hungary would, with the blessing of
Germany, unite their fleets in time of war, even though they were
essentially built to counter one another. The convention remained void,
of course, as Italy stayed neutral at the outbreak anyway. While many
of these examples will hold the readers attention, much of the minutia
that the author goes into on things such shipping losses, failed ambush
attempts, and counter sweeps becomes quite bland. Citing the meticulous
planning of the raid in an entire chapter may also seem cumbrous, but it
does show the intricacies of warfare that had to be undertaken, even in
a relatively obscure and previously neglected naval theatre.
Halpern
also admits that operations around the Straights were a stalemate for
most of the war. It is clear that the Austro-Hungarian navy was masked
off from major operations in the Mediterranean and could only enter it
at the risk of losing the few major vessels that they had; while a
threat at the opening of the Straight, rarely did they venture out of
the them where the Entente forces had clear naval superiority. But he
also points out the clear strategic value for the
German-Austria-Hungarian side of having access through the
Mediterranean, especially after the first German U-boats – UB7 and UB8 –
were sent to operate from Austrian bases in the Adriatic. Halpern
thoughtfully explains how the Austro-Hungarians and Germans were
extremely successful at sinking Allied shipping, as the British, French
and Italian navies lacked any unified command and the convoy system was
not yet fully used. The weather was also better in the Mediterranean
than the Atlantic or the North sea, allowing them to operate more often.
The Allies, of course,
realized that many of these subs traveled into the Mediterranean through
the straights of Otranto, and it was, therefore, a targeted chokepoint
for most of the war and why Halpern’s volume is worth the read. The
focus of the book is the attempt of the Austro-Hungarians to attack the
Allied drifter boats armed with nets and mines that disrupted submarine
activity. During the raid, the Kriegsmarine circumvented the
Otranto Barrage, designed by the Allies to prevent access by enemy
submarines to the Mediterranean via the Adriatic, and attacked the
Allied drifter boats, sinking fourteen of them. During this
‘Mediterranean Jutland’ the Austro-Hungarians were then cut off from
their base in the Adriatic and Halpern somewhat lionizes the process by
which they managed to escape and return to base safely. It is
definitely a story of the underdog and Halpern’s energetic and
articulate writing engross the reader as he explains how the “weaker
fleet was able to escape while inflicting more damage than it suffered
itself.” Some readers are probably even a little sad when they discover
that, with the end of the war and the end of the Habsburg Empire the
k.u.k. Kriegsmarine was divided among the Allies. The
Austro-Hungarian navy was then nothing more than a “historical
curiosity”. While this book may seem far too specialized to many, it is
books like these, on seemingly obscure parts of the war, that help make
this tangled global story complete.
Aaron is
a doctoral candidate in the Department of History and a research
associate with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the
University of Calgary. He received his Bachelor of Arts in History at
the University of Alberta in 1998, and a Masters in War Studies at the
Royal Military College of Canada in 2001, where he did a thesis on
Canadian weapons procurement from 1907 to 1953. He is currently writing
on the ongoing Sea King replacement.
|
|
 |